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SEAPOL WORKSHOP 
OCEAN GOVERNANCE AND SYSTEM COMPLIANCE 
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC CONTEXT 
RAYONG, THAILAND, DECEMBER 9-1~, 1997 
SOUTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE 
Among the latest developments inducing system compliance is 
the conclusion of the Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free 
Zone on December 15, 1995 during the Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok. 
As the Author of a Note introducing this Treaty in a recent 
publication of the American Society of International law, 11 I am 
particularly pleased to have been invited to present to the 
Workshop the impact and implications of the Bangkok Treaty. 
OBJECT AND PURPOSE 
The Treaty was published in 1996 as part of the Basic 
Documents of the Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok, December 14-15, 
1995. 21 In the context of implementation of the Ocean Law as 
incorporated in the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, 31 the 
1) 
2) 
See Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone with 
Annex and Protocol, done in Bangkok, December 15, 1995, 35 
International Legal Materials (I.L.M.), (1996). 
See Bangkok Summit Declaration and Annexes, in 35 I.L.M. 
(1996). 
31 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Index 
and Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), United Nations, New York, 1983; 
see, in particular, Section 9 : Responsibility and Liability, 
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Treaty of 1995 on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
represents yet another endeavor to reiterate the wishes of the 
sovereign peoples of ten Southeast Asian nations and to reaffirm 
their determination to promote the region from environmental 
pollution and the hazards posed by radioactive wastes and other 
radioactive materials, 41 and to establish the sub-region of 
Southeast Asia as a zone free of nuclear weapon, including the use 
of threat thereof. 
The ten States Parties to the Treaty clearly expressed their 
desire to contribute to the realization of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to maintain 
peace and stability in the region in the spirit of peaceful 
coexistence and mutual understanding and cooperation as enunciated 
in various communiques, declarations and legal instruments, both 
within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and prior 
to the formation of ASEAN, such as the Joint Communiques of the 
Asian African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. 51 
The Southeast Asian States were determined to take concrete 
action contributing to the progress towards general and complete 
disarmament of nuclear weapons and thereby to promote international 
peace and security. Recalling the Declaration on the Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) signed in Kuala Lumpur on 
November 27, 1971 and the Program of Action on ZOPFAN adopted at 
the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in July 1993, the 
ten Southeast Asian nations were convinced that the establishment 
of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone for Southeast Asia as an essential 
component of the ZOPFAN could contribute towards enhancing 
international peace and security as a whole. The creation of a 
nuclear weapon-free zone was also prompted by the Final Document of 
4] 
5] 
in Article 235 (1), (2) and (3). 
See the last preambular paragraph of the Treaty cited in Note 
1 above. 
See the Joint Communique of April 22, 1955, at Bandung, 
Indonesia. 
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the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
which encourages the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zone and 
by concluding regional treaties, Southeast Asian nations 
reaffirmed their right to assure the total absence of nuclear 
weapons in their respective territories. 
It was also recalled that in 1995 the Parties to the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) adopted the Principles and 
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, calling 
for the cooperation of all nuclear-weapon States and their respect 
and support for the relevant protocols to achieve the maximum 
effectiveness of this Southeast Asian Treaty, designed to protect 
the region from the hazards of contamination of the environment by 
radioactive substances.~ 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
For the purpose of the Treaty and its Protocol, "Southeast 
Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone" means the area comprising the 
territories of all States in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, 
continental shelves and Exclusive Economic 
Malaysia, Myanmar, 
and their respective 
Zones (EEZ) . 71 The 
expression "territory" means the land territory, internal waters, 
territorial sea, archipelagic waters, the seabed and sub-soil 
thereof and the airspace above them.~ 
The Treaty and its Protocol apply to the territories, 




See the preambular paragraphs of the Treaty cited in Note 1 
above. 
See the Treaty cited in Note 1 above, Articles 1 Use of 
Terms (a) "Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone". 
Ibid., Article 1 (b) : Territory. 
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in which the Treaty is in force. 91 Its application is without 
prejudice to the exercise of these rights by any State under the 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 1982, in particular with regard to freedom of the high seas, 
rights of innocent passage, archipalagic sea lanes passage or 
transit passage of ships and aircraft, and consistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations . 101 
While reserving intact the rights of all States under the Law 
of the Sea Convention with respect to freedom of the high seas, 
each State Party undertakes 111 explicitly not to 
"(a) Dump at sea or discharge into atmosphere anywhere 
within the zone any radioactive material or waste; 
(b) Dispose radioactive material or waste on land in 
the territory of or under the jurisdiction of other 
States ..... ; or 
(c) Allow, within its territory, any other State to 
dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere any 
radioactive material or waste." 
The Treaty also preserves intact the right of the States 
Parties to use nuclear energy, in particular for their economic 
development and social progress and generally for peaceful 
purposes. 121 
Dumping as part of the undertakings by the States Parties 
means "any deliberate disposal at sea of radioactive waste or other 
matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made 
91 Ibid., Article 2 : Application of the Treaty, para 1. 
101 Ibid., Article 2, para 2. 
11] 
12] 
Ibid. 1 Article 3 
Ibid. 1 Article 4 
Purposes. 
Basic Undertakings, para 3. 
Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful 
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structures at sea,rn containing radioactive material".~ 
BASIC UNDERTAKINGS 
The significance of a Treaty depends on the obligations it 
prescribes for States Parties to undertake to implement by way of 
positive action or abstinence from the commission of certain 
actions or omissions. In the Treaty under examination, the State 
parties undertake not to, anywhere inside or outside the zone 
"(a) Develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess 
or have control over nuclear weapons; 
(b) Station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; 
or 
(c) test or use nuclear weapons. 11151 
Nor will they allow any other State to do what they themselves have 
undertaken to refrain from doing.~ State parties further 
undertake not to dump at sea or to discharge into the atmosphere 
anywhere within the zone any radioactive material or waste, 17l nor 
to allow any other State to do the same. 181 
What is even more crucial is the undertaking of each State 
Party not to seek or receive any assistance in the commission of 








Ibid., Article 1 (g) (i); see also Article 1 (e) : "Radioactive 
material" means material that contains radionuclides above 
clearance or exemption levels recommended by the IAEA. 
Ibid. I Article 1 (g) (ii); see likewise in Article 1 (f) for 
"radioactive waste". 
Ibid. I Article 3 1 para 1. 
Ibid. I Article 3, para 2. 
Ibid. I Article 3 1 para 3 (a) and (b) . 
Ibid. I Article 3, para 3 (c) 
Ibid. I Article 3 t para 4 (a) 
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any action to assist or encourage the commission of any act in 
violation of the above.~ 
Thus, the States Parties in effect undertake to refrain from 
any act that would endanger the peace and tranquility of the region 
by the introduction, transport, use or threat of any nuclear 
weapon. These undertakings constitute complete and total 
abstention from any act conceivably likely to permit contamination 
of the region through environmental pollution thereby freeing the 
zone from the hazards posed by radioactive waste and 0ther 
radioactive materials. This total rejection of the potential 
hazards does not preclude the legitimate and peaceful use of 
nuclear energy for national economic development within the region 
consistently with the standards and reasonable safeguards of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA) . States Parties are 
required to conclude agreements with the IAEA for this purpose. 211 
MECHANISMS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE 
To oversee the implementation of the Southeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and to ensure compliance with its 
provisions, a Commission is established. Each State Party is 
represented on the Commission by its Foreign Minister or his 
representative, accompanied by alternates and advisers. The 
Commission meets also in conjunction with the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting. Two-thirds of the members of the Commission constitute a 
quorum, each member having one vote. Decisions of the Commission 
are taken by consensus, failing which a two-third majority of the 
members present and voting is required. The Commission adopts its 
20] 
21] 
Ibid., Article 3, para 4 (b). 
Ibid., Article 5 : IAEA Safeguards : 11 Each State Party which 
has not done so shall conclude an agreement with the IAEA for 
the application of full scope safeguards to its peaceful 
nuclear activities not later than eighteen months after the 
entry into force for that State Party of this Treaty ... 
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own rules of procedure as well as financial regulations governing 
its fund and subsidiary organ. 221 
The Executive Committee is set up as a subsidiary organ of the 
Commission to perform the functions listed in the Treaty and to 
carry out such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the 
Commission. 231 The Executive Committee's main function is to 
ensure proper operation and verification measures in accordance 
with the control system established under article 10, 241 The IAEA 
safeguards system, report and exchange of information,~l request 
for clarification. 261 and request and procedures for a fact-finding 
mission.~ Another important function of the Executive Committee 
is to consider and decide on requests for clarification and for a 
fact-finding mission, 28l and to consider and decide on the findings 
of a fact-finding mission and report to the Commission, 291 and to 
request the Commission to convene a meeting as appropriate. 301 
The Executive Committee is composed of all States Parties to 
the Treaty at the level of Senior Officials and representatives who 
may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 311 The Executive 
Committee is empowered to conclude such agreements with the IAEA or 
n1 Ibid., Article 8 : Establishment of the Commission for the 
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. 
231 Ibid., Article 9 : the Executive Committee. 
24] Ibid., Article 10 Control System. 
25] Ibid., Article 11 Report and Exchange of Information. 
26] Ibid., Article 12 Request for Clarification. 
27] Ibid., Article 13 Request for a Fact-Finding Mission. 
281 Ibid., Article 9, para 3 (b) . 
291 Ibid., Article 9, para 3 (d) . 
301 Ibid., Article 9, para 3 (e) . 
311 Ibid., Article 9, para 2. 
8 
other international organizations on behalf of the Commission321 
after being duly authorized. 331 The rules of procedure for the 
Executive Committee are the same as those of the Commission with 
regard to voting and consensus . 341 
REMEDIAL MEASURES 
While the Treaty is not yet in full operation pending the 
process of ratification in accordance with the constitutional 
procedure of its signatories to initiate its entry into force, it 
is clear that the Commission and Executive Committee together with 
other mechanisms such as fact-finding missions and procedures for 
exchange of information and the IAEA safeguards system as part of 
its Control System dispose of effective remedial measures in the 
event the Executive Committee determines the existence of a breach 
of the Treaty by a State Party. There flows an obligation on that 
State Party to take all steps necessary to bring itself in full 
compliance with the Treaty and to inform the Committee promptly of 
the action taken and proposed to be taken by it. 351 In case of 
non-compliance or refusal to comply, the Commission may be convened 
to consider and decide on any measure it deems appropriate to cope 
with the emergent situation, including the submission of the matter 
to the IAEA, and where international peace and security might be 
endangered to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. 361 
32] Ibid. I Article 18 Relations with other International 
Organizations. 
33] Ibid. I Article 9, para 3 (f) . 
34] Ibid. I Article 9, paras 6 1 7 and 8. 
35] Ibid. I Article 14 : Remedial Measures. 
36] Ibid. 1 3613 Article 14, paras 2, 3 and 4. 
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CONCLUSION 
While the remedial measures envisaged in the provisions of the 
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Treaty may not offer an 
absolute guarantee of an instant provisional measure to compel the 
immediate cessation of any act in violation of the Treaty 
provisions, they nonetheless provide useful preliminary steps to be 
taken with promptness and effectiveness to ensure an adequate 
alertness leading to the adoption of corrective and preventive 
precautionary measures to mitigate, abate and contain the injury 
which could be inflicted upon by the environment of the zone. 
Having regard to the still primitive nature of international 
law and the hesitancy and equivocation reflected in the recent 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the 
"Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict" on July 8, 1996, 371 the need for a more decisive and 
explicit statement of the Law on the question has become more than 
ever highly critical. If we were still left in doubt about the 
legality or illegality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons by 
a State in the absence of an authoritative judicial pronouncement, 
let us fortify ourselves even though sub specie legis ferendae with 
the reaffirmation of our faithful convictions that the use or 
threat of nuclear weapons is strictly prohibited in Southeast Asia, 
and that this regional prohibition would expand further from 
existing regional nuclear bans to cover ultimately the entirety of 
the globe, so that one day humanity may cease to live under 
constant fear of its total annihilation by the trigger of an 
irresponsible person regardless of gender, race, color or religious 
belief. 
In this respect and to this end, the Treaty under 
consideration could provide an answer albeit partial to the urgent 
need for certainty in the rules of international law. It is our 
371 See I. c. J. Reports 1996, p. 66 : Legality of the Use by a 
State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion. 
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final call on the signatories of the Treaty to implement the 
realization of the dreams cherished by five hundred million 
Southeast Asian peoples for the enforcement of a zone free of 
nuclear weapons by ratifying the Treaty. Equally we would like to 
challenge the nuclear States listed in the protocol, namely, the 
People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian 
Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the United States of America to the task of signing the 
Protocol and acceding to the Treaty. 
Sompong SUCHARITKUL* 
San Francisco, November 23, 1997 
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